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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of chain governance on chain performance
among the chain members.
Design/methodology/approach – The survey was conducted in a triadic context with 345 chain members
(115 dairy farmers, 115 dairy cooperative managers, and 115 processors) of the dairy sector in Uganda.
Data collection was performed through simple random sampling by survey questionnaires with the chain
executives. SEM was used for data analysis.
Findings – The results revealed several chain governance structures (spot market, relational, contractual
and mini integration) confirmed the hypothesized correlations on chain performance at different chain levels.
The authors found a positive influence of relational governance on chain performance for all the chain
members; however, the effect is stronger at the first supplier chain level.
Originality/value – This triadic chain approach makes an original contribution to the chain governance
structures and chain performance literature in the supply chain context. Studies analyzing all aspects of chain
governance structure and chain performance at three chain levels are limited.
Keywords Triad, Dairy sector, Chain governance structures, Chain performance
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The literature on chain governance structure has received significant attention, this topic has
been widely studied considering the analysis of inter-organizational relationships as a
multi-dimensional phenomenon, which is embedded in the supplier–buyer relationships and
processes (Dolci et al., 2017). Over the last two decades, the concept of governance has also been
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applied to the supply chain area (Cai et al., 2011; Claro et al., 2003; Zhang and Aramyan, 2009;
Ferguson et al., 2005; Mesic et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018). In these studies, it has been either
referred to as supply chain governance or relationship quality. In this paper, the governance
structure is defined as the institutional arrangements within which transactions are negotiated
and executed (Williamson, 1991). The term chain governance structures focuses on adopting an
uncertain environment to enhance performance. Therefore, the evaluation of effectiveness and
efficiency of chain governance structures involves using metrics related to various performance
objectives such as cost, responsiveness, flexibility and quality (Zhang and Aramyan, 2009). In
contrast to chain performance, we propose that chain governance is concerned with the balance
between long-term relational decisions and interdependency that exists among supplier–buyer
relationships (Richey Jr et al., 2010).
In addition, elements of chain governance are presented with different classification in
the extant literature (Kataike and Gellynck, 2018). For example, a contract is classified as a
mechanism (Yu et al., 2006), and as a structure (Raynaud et al. (2005), while incentive is
defined as a mechanism (Wathne and Heide, 2004; Kashyap et al., 2012). The same applies to
relational governance, where proxies have been used, such as trust (Poppo et al., 2016; Chen
et al., 2013), informal ties (Stouthuysen et al., 2017), social control (Osmonbekov et al., 2016),
and cooperation or solidarity (Fałkowski et al., 2017). The previous literature also shows that
there are several dimensions of governance, but none have defined this concept precisely as
distinguishable multiple components and elements (Wacker et al., 2016; Dolci et al., 2017;
Chen et al., 2017). Therefore, the contributions of several studies are isolated, and proxy
constructs have been used when considering necessary elements of chain governance
structures, which can improve chain performance (Chen et al., 2004).
Notably, researchers have used different governance structures ranging within a
continuum frommarket (“buy”) to vertical integration (“make”) to explain coordination in food
chains (Gellynck and Molnár, 2009; Raynaud et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2007; Wever et al.,
2010). In particular, Gellynck and Molnár (2009) depicted product, chain level and country-
specific characteristics of governance structures used in European food chains. Wever et al.
(2012) proposed a framework that includes price, volume, quality and investments to assess
governance structures. Raynaud et al. (2005) use six types of governance structures following
a hierarchical sequence namely, spot market, relational contract, relational contract with an
approved partner, formal written contract, equity-based contract and vertical integration to
analyze their alignment between quality. Schulze et al. (2007) present a typology of
governance structures used in pork chains: spot market, long-term, relationships, marketing
contracts, production contracts, farming contracts and vertical integration.
Despite the vastness of research dealing with chain governance and chain performance,
most of the literature has paid little attention to the complexity of governance structures
that underlie chain performance in triadic agri-food chains. Therefore, the contribution of
this paper is quadruple. First, most of the literature deal with either the governance part
or the performance part overlooking the correlation between the two concepts. For example,
the study by Gellynck and Molnár (2009) focused on the determinant factors of the chain
governance structure in the European food sector without relating to chain performance.
Second, the exception that discusses the relationship between chain governance structure
and chain performance lack completeness particularly in governance structure constructs and
the level of chain analysis. Instead of using various forms of governance structures, they limit
their investigation on only one or two. Examples of such studies include Birthal et al. (2017), who
examined contractual and relational governance and their association with profitability and
efficiency. Similarly, Poppo et al. (2016) discussed the impact of contracts and trust on supplier
performance. Abdi and Aulakh (2017) carried out an explorative study that addressed the
relational and contractual governance in relation to mutual relationship strengthening. Han et al.
(2011) attempted to explore the association between transaction costs on spot market,
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contractual and relational and quality management of the pork processors. Panayides and Lun
(2009) analyzed the influence of trust on the innovativeness aspect of chain performance and
found that there are positive effects of trust on the innovativeness of the supply chains.
Third, some studies on chain governance and chain performance focused on conceptual
framework developments and systematic reviews which need to be supported by empirical
evidence. For instance, studies reported by Zhang and Aramyan (2009) and Aramyan et al.
(2006) and could be mentioned as an example in regard to the conceptual framework, and
Cao and Lumineau (2015) and Kataike and Gellynck (2018) are examples of literature reviews.
Finally, many empirical studies on chain governance structures and performance have
been focusing on individual firms in a supply chain (Srinivasan et al., 2011; Sezen, 2008; Min
and Mentzer, 2004) or on the dyads (Birthal et al., 2017; Nyaga et al., 2013; Han et al., 2011;
Srinivasan et al., 2011) Dyadic level chain analysis collects data from two firms of a dyad,
the focal company and either an upstream or a downstream firm to the focal company
(Capaldo and Giannoccaro, 2015; Burkert et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2010;
Benton and Maloni, 2005). According to previous research, chain analysis of a supply chain
at a dyadic level does not bring out the underlying dimensions of the entire chain (Odongo
et al., 2016; Kühne et al., 2013; Mentzer et al., 2001). Consequently, researchers have an
increasing interest in evaluating the chain governance structure and performance of triads
(Molnár et al., 2010; Holma, 2012). However, owing to a rather complicated data collection
based on a triadic approach, there are only a few papers applying this approach, especially
in the agri-food sector. Therefore, to contribute to this field, this research paper attempts to
investigate the interface between chain governance structures and chain performance in
triad agri-food chains.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a theoretical framework and the derived
research hypotheses. Section 3 details the adopted methodology, Section 4 the analysis and
presentation of the findings, Section 5 the discussion and interpretation of obtained findings
and Section 6 discusses the managerial implications. Section 7 provides concluding remarks
and study limitations to shape the future research agenda.
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Three theoretical perspectives are suggested through which the concepts chain governance
structures and chain performance can be viewed. First, the transaction cost theory (TCT)
predicts that the most efficient governance structures are those that minimize production and
transaction costs considering the institutional environment wherein (Williamson, 2000;
Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). The institutional environment is where formal and informal
rules are set in order to reduce uncertainties and transaction costs. This suggests that simple
governance structures should be used in conjunction with simple contractual relations and
complex governance structures are reserved for complex relations (Williamson, 1979; Zhang
and Aramyan, 2009). The theory argues that well-established contractual governance could be
an effective mechanism to control exchange hazards by specifying each party’s roles in both
stable and changing environments (Cao and Lumineau, 2015).
Second, the resource-based view (RBV) theory presents a broader understanding of the
influence of resources on performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Cabrera‐Suárez et al., 2001;
Grant, 1996; Barney and Clark, 2007). RBV assumes that tangible and intangible resources
will provide a sustainable competitive advantage when they are valuable to the firm
(e.g. dairy coolers, pasteurizer, need-based training) (Barney et al., 2001). This theory sees
resources as having a dynamic influence on sustained competitive advantage (Helfat and
Peteraf, 2003). These authors argue that firms adapt their resources over time to the
different stages of their capability life cycle. Rungtusanatham et al. (2003) suggest that
the linkages between buyers and suppliers are key resources for decisions such as
“make or- buy” in the supply chain.
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The third theory is the relational exchange theory, which highlights relational norms
such as trust, solidarity and cooperation of the chain members’ relationships. Chain partners
are expected to behave according to the shared relational norms (Heide, 1994; Wathne et al.,
2018; Aulakh et al., 1996; Palmatier et al., 2007). Thus, relational norms are also considered
as an effective type of governance in existing buyer–supplier relationship literature (Zhang
and Aramyan, 2009; Zhou and Xu, 2012; Xie et al., 2016). The existing literature on chain
governance structures and performance, and these three main theories are often used
concurrently. the TCT is traditionally used to support the effectiveness of contractual
governance, whereas RBV considers integration or buy decisions. Finally, the above
mentioned three theories are directly related to different forms of chain governance
structure to influence performance.
Research hypotheses and conceptual model
Spot market and chain performance. Market governance with classical contracting for non-
specific transactions often happens in the spot market where demand and supply are
determined by prices (Zhang and Aramyan, 2009). In spot market arrangements, suppliers
are likely to act opportunistically in order to realize a short-term profit from the transaction
(Gyau and Spiller, 2008). Against this background, chain partners may generally incur some
costs as a way to safeguard themselves against the possible opportunistic attitudes. Hence,
transaction costs may increase and the overall economic performance may be reduced.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1. Spot market transactions are negatively related to chain performance.
Relational governance and chain performance. Relational governance arises from the presence
of trust due to long-time commitment among the chain members. Arranz and Arroyabe (2012)
noted that relational norms are more forceful in improving performance because long-time
commitment reduces costs associated with recurrent disputes, posturing and renegotiations.
Likewise, Yang et al. (2012) observed that relational governance has a positive and significant
effect on the channel performance of the exporters. As reported by Morgan and Hunt (1994),
when both commitment and trust are present, they produce outcomes that promote efficiency,
productivity and effectiveness. Lui et al. (2009) found that relational mechanisms are likely to
be more effective in improving the performance between companies in a supply chain that has
a long-term relationship. The following hypothesis is set to be tested:
H2. Relational governance is positively related to chain performance.
Contractual governance and chain performance. Contractual governance is legal
enforcement in the form of written contracts used to govern the transaction whose
performance and behavioral standards are specified in the contract (Wever et al., 2010).
Ferguson et al. (2005) found that contractual governance is positively associated with
the performance but to a much lesser extent. Performance may be affected when detailed
contracts are used without a well-developed social relationship (Cannon et al., 2000).
Contracts are also a way of providing guarantees to companies in the agri-food chains
and ensuring conformity in the performed actions (Ferguson et al., 2005; Paulin et al.,
1997). In a current investigation, Dolci et al. (2017) identified a significant and positive
relationship between contractual governance and chain performance. The following
hypothesis will be tested:
H3. Contractual governance is positively related to chain performance.
Mini integration and performance. Mini integrations (MIs) are arrangements coordinated by
big processors by means of formal or informal agreements with dairy cooperatives. In these
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transactions, the integrators may allocate equipment and technical support in production,
depending on the farming stage and type of agreement (Martins et al., 2017). MIs are
stronger resource control and coordination mechanisms associated with hierarchies and
power are more effective in dealing with difficulties related to the performance of the
agri-food chains (Ruzzier, 2009). Firms integrate to build entry barriers, facilitate
investments in specialized assets, protect product quality, and improve scheduling and
coordination (Williamson, 1975). We propose the following hypothesis:
H4. MI is positively related to chain performance (Figure 1).
3. Methodology
Measurement scale of the questionnaire
In this paper, the endogenous variable chain performance is generally measured
subjectively and objectively (Dawes, 1999). An objective way of measuring performance is
based on objective data or the financial indicators of enterprises (e.g. profits, inventory and
turnover) (Mesic et al., 2018). However, many agri-food companies are often unwilling to
release information on the financial operations of their company (Collins and Collins, 2001).
In this regard, Ward et al. (1994) suggested the subjective way of measuring the
performance, which is based on the respondents’ subjective perception of the chain
performance (Covin and Slevin, 1989). Previous studies have shown that perceived
assessments are consistent with objective performance (Molnár et al., 2010; Vickery et al.,
2003; Odongo et al., 2016). An appropriate measuring instrument is required for the
subjective performance measurement, which will quantitatively show how successful the
agri-food chain is and whether there is a potential for improving chain performance (Cohen
and Roussel, 2005). The construct chain performance was measured by four key indicators
illustrated in Table I.
In order to operationalize this framework, we ensured transparency and rigor in the
research process, a survey protocol was adopted to guide the research advocated by Yin
(2013). A set of theoretical propositions were derived from the theoretical framework to
design the questionnaire and guide the data collection process. The key data collection tool
was a questionnaire administered to the chain members. In a survey, the protocol plays an
important role in ensuring reliability, providing information so that the research, which is
repeated under the same conditions, obtains the same results (Yin, 2013). The protocol used
in the survey was developed in consideration with the chain governance elements and chain
performance variables mentioned in Tables I and II. Thus, the content of the survey
included questions to understand each of the variables of chain governance structures and
chain performance, to verify the variables that emerge from literature (Kataike and
H1–
Chain governance structures
Chain performance
Relational
Spot market
H2+
H4+
H3+
Contractual
• Efficiency
• Flexibility
• Responsiveness
• Quality and safety
Mini
integrationFigure1.Conceptual model
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Gellynck, 2018). Therefore, the protocol used in this study was developed to investigate the
relationship between chain governance structures and chain performance, particularly
focusing on the following specific research questions:
RQ1. How do spot market transactions affect chain performance?
RQ2. What is the association between relational governance and chain performance?
Construct Item Code Author (s)
Chain performance CP
Efficiency Reduced production cost EFF1 Neely (1999), Molnár et al. (2010), Beamon (1999),
Chopra et al. (2017), Aramyan et al. (2007), Kühne
et al. (2013), Fattahi et al. (2013), Grunert (2005)
Reduced distribution cost EFF2
Reduced storage cost EFF3
Return on investment EFF4
Profitability EFF5
Responsiveness Time lead RES1 Gunasekaran et al. (2001) (Aramyan et al., 2007),
Beamon (1999)Customer complaint RES2
Response time RES3
Fill rate RES4
Delivery errors RES5
Quality and safety Reduced defect rate QTY1 Fattahi et al. (2013), Aramyan et al. (2007),
Chopra et al. (2017), Gellynck et al. (2008),
Gunasekaran et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2004)
Safety QTY2
Healthy QTY3
Package quality QTY4
Flexibility Volume flexibility FLE1 Aramyan et al. (2007), Fattahi et al. (2013),
Neely (1999)Delivery flexibility FLE2
Response to competition FLE3
New requirements FLE4
Table I.
Constructs, items and
code used for
endogenous variable
Construct Item Code Author (s)
Chain governance CGS
Spot market Identify irrelevant SMKT1 Gyau and Spiller (2008), Han et al. (2011),
Zhang and Aramyan (2009)Price incentive SMKT2
Immediate sells SMKT3
Own resources SMKT4
Any customer SMKT5
Relational Trust RGS1 Arranz and Arroyabe (2012), Chen et al. (2013),
Morgan and Hunt (1994), Ferguson et al. (2005),
Han et al. (2011), Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009),
Yang et al. (2012), Dolci et al. (2017),
Zhou and Poppo (2010)
Cooperation RGS2
Commitment RGS3
Relationship RGS4
Collaboration RGS5
Contracts Incentives CGS1 Poppo and Zhou (2014), Zhang and Hu (2011),
Wang et al. (2011), Houston and Johnson (2000),
Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009), Dolci et al. (2017)
Power CGS2
Settle conflicts CGS3
Control CGS4
Rights and oblig. CGS5
Mini integration Resource control MIGS1 Gyau and Spiller (2008), Ruzzier (2009),
Williamson (1975), Buvik and Andersen (2002),
Rothaermel et al. (2006)
Joint planning MIGS2
Joint decisions MIGS3
Share resources MIGS4
Follow rules MIGS5
Mutual benefits MIGS6
Joint production plan MIGS7
Table II.
Constructs, item and
code used for
exogenous variable
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RQ3. Is there a significant relationship between contractual governance and chain
performance?
RQ4. How does MI affect chain performance?
Data collection
Through simple random sampling, a survey was conducted with 345 supply chain members:
115 first suppliers, 115 second suppliers and 115 buyers. The aim of the simple random sample
was to reduce the potential for human bias in the selection of cases to be included in the sample.
As a result, the simple random sample provided us with a sample that is highly representative
of the population being studied. We obtained a sampling frame from the data manager at a
dairy development authority containing all dairy cooperatives/second suppliers forming a
population from which a sample was taken. Research participants from the first supplying firm
included farm owners because they deemed appropriate informants being familiar with the
daily operations. They also have regular interactions with the senior managers of the second
supplying firm. We began our data collection with the complete list of all second suppliers
working for the first supplier and the buyer. The second supplier provided responses to
measurement items pertaining to the buyer and the first supplier. In the context of this study,
supplier-initiated triads have their origin in a decision by the supplier to use a third party to
mediate and/or support the exchange with the customer/buyer. For instance, dairy farmers
decide to work with primary cooperatives in direct contact with the processors (Wynstra et al.,
2015; Mena et al., 2013).
Data analysis
First, from the qualitative information presented in Tables I and II, a quantitative questionnaire
was designed and pre-tested (Malhotra and Birks, 2007). Second, reflective indicators
were analyzed to generate reliability and exploratory convergent factor analysis was applied to
refine the preliminary questionnaire with Varimax orthogonal rotation method (Hair et al., 2014).
The ratings from the α of constructs and the instrument were over 0.6, which is considered
satisfactory for investigatory research (Hair et al., 2006). Factor loadings below 0.5 were
discarded, as recommended by Gratz and Roemer (2004). Thus, the construct contractual
governance items CGS2 and CGS4 were eliminated, equally for spot market and MI, and two
items were deleted for each as indicated in Table II. Therefore, the original 26 items turned out
to be 19, since 7 items were deleted during model specification as illustrated in the measurement
model in Figure 2. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin sample adequacy tests and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity provided acceptable ratings of 0.825 with a significance level of 0.00, respectively.
This suggests that important correlations exist between items.
Third, confirmatory factor analysis based on SEM was analyzed. A sample size close to
200 respondents is enough to use SEM, and the model’s stability would be really doubtful
when the ratio between the number of subjects and parameters is less than 5:1, according
to Kline (1998). Therefore, the pooled sample for the proposed measurement model with
47 parameters was estimated and 460 cases were satisfactory to assess model fit through a
specific measurement model software for SEM (AMOS 22), which, thus, defined the
measurement model with the constructs and respective items. Convergent validity is the
next step, which means the observation of the ratings and the standardized factor values.
To evaluate the adequacy of the ratings and unidimensionality, standardized residual
covariance and modification indexes were analyzed.
Fourth, discriminant validity, the relationship between the average variance extracted
(AVE) and the square of the correlation between the factors was computed. All values were
according to those recommended by Hair et al. (2017). Finally, construct reliability, the AVE
and the composite reliability of each construct were calculated. All values were over 0.5 for
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the AVE and over 0.7 for composite reliability, showing the measurement model to be
reliable. Also, the adjustment indexes were calculated, based upon the revised measurement
model. All values were considered acceptable. We can observe the final measurement model
with the indexes in Figure 2 and Table III, respectively.
4. Results
According to the research methodology set, the main research findings are presented in five
sections: reliability and validity scores of the questionnaire are presented in Table III; the
measurement model for the total sample is presented as Figure 2 and a full SEM for total
sample demonstrated in Figure 3; the model fit indices for each subsample is presented in
Table IV; and the path coefficients for testing the hypotheses are presented in Table V of
each sample. Finally, the structural models related to the hypothesis are appended.
Based on the satisfactory CFA result for the measurement model, a full SEM was run first
for the total sample (Model 1) and then for the four subgroups of chain members. The tested
Model 1 summarizes the chain governance structures and their relationships on chain
performance as shown in Figure 3. In general, this model performed well as indicated by the
goodness-of-fit indices χ2/df¼ 2.387, CFI¼ 0.947, RMSEA¼ 0.051, GFI¼ 0.900, NFI¼ 0.936,
IFI¼ 0.948 and AGFI¼ 0.901. The standardized estimates for Model 1 indicated that
relational governance and MI positively influence chain performance. With regard to the spot
market, there is a significant negative impact on chain performance. Remarkable was the
RGS1
RGS2
RGS3
RGS4
RGS5
SMKT1
SMKT3
SMKT5
CGS3
CGS1
CGS5
VIGS1
VIGS2
VIGS3
VIGS4
MEFF
MRES
MFLEX
MQLTY
CP
VIGS
CGS
SMKT
RGS
e5
e4
e3
e2
e1
e8
e7
e6
e11
e10
e9
e15
e14
e13
e12
e19
e18
e17
e16
0.83
0.95
0.95
0.64
0.99
0.90
0.970.66
0.83
0.87
0.93
0.92
0.97
0.93
0.96
0.91
–0.26
–0.05
–0.22
–0.19
–0.13
–0.32
–0.56
0.35
0.21
–0.01
0.97
0.87
0.98
0.87
0.97
Notes: n=460. Model fit statistics are: 2/df=1.869, RMSEA=0.044,
GFI=0.944, AGFI=0.924, CFI=0.970, NFI=0.978, IFI=0.970
Figure 2.
Revised measurement
model pooled sample
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insignificant relationship between contractual governance and chain performance. The
coefficients were too small, suggesting that formal contracts do not predict the dairy chain
performance. It is possibly due to weak legal enforcement for such a perishable product (milk).
For the subgroups, a significant and strong relationship between different path estimates
was observed. This kind of modeling allows the simultaneous estimation of a series of
distinct multiple equations, which are related to each other based on the used theory and
Construct Code Mean SD Variance α CR AVE
Relational
RGS1 3.13 1.51 2.97
RGS2 3.77 1.48 2.19 0.976 0.821 0.69
RGS3 4.10 1.39 1.98
RGS4 3.76 1.44 2.23
RGS5 3.80 1.49 2.09
Mini integration
MIGS3 2.51 1.51 2.30
MIGS1 2.44 1.50 2.26 0.907 0.889 0.70
MIGS4 2.50 1.62 2.63
MIGS2 2.49 1.57 2.47
Contractual
CGS1 2.00 1.35 1.82
CGS3 2.00 1.34 1.79 0.956 0.854 0.68
CGS5 1.97 1.38 1.91
Spot market
SMKT1 1.85 1.14 1.31
SMKT3 187 1.16 1.34 0.952 0.892 0.71
SMKT5 2.00 1.10 1.24
Chain performance
EFF 4.29 0.84 0.71
RES 4.31 0.88 0.78 0.906 0.835 0.68
FLE 4.32 0.87 0.78
QTY 4.31 0.81 0.67
Note: n¼ 460
Table III.
Descriptive analysis of
variables for the
pooled sample
Notes: Model fit statistics are: 2/df=2.387, RMSEA=0.051,
GFI=0.910, AGFI=901, CFI=0.947; NFI=0.936, IFI=0.948
Figure 3.
Total sample
summarizing the link
between chain
governance structures
and chain
performance
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theoretical references. The summary of all fit indexes and path coefficients of the structural
models is presented in Tables IV and V. It is worth mentioning that in the subgroups’
structural models, we used reflective models because, according to Hair et al. (2006),
measures are expected to be correlated with internal consistency reliability. In this case,
dropping an indicator from the model does not alter the meaning of the construct and it
takes the measurement error into account at the item level ( Jarvis et al., 2003).
5. Discussion
The paper provides several important findings for the relationship between chain
governance structures and chain performance for the Ugandan dairy sector. Empirical
evidence shows that H1 was partially supported. First suppliers and Second suppliers at
their downstream observed a significant and positive influence of spot market on chain
performance. The result builds on the findings of Gyau and Spiller (2008), who observed a
positive correlation between the spot market and performance (i.e. cost reduction, financial
success and satisfaction). On the contrary, buyers observed an insignificant and negative
link between spot market and chain performance. This finding is in accordance with
previous research (Han et al., 2011; Wever et al., 2010). It can be attributed to the fact that
spot market dairy suppliers often act opportunistically in order to realize short-term profits.
This result is expected because Ugandan dairy processors (buyer) prefer more coordinated
chain governance structures with their suppliers (Trienekens et al., 2018; Gyau and Spiller,
2008; Williamson, 1991; Hobbs and Young, 2000).
The interaction between relational governance and chain performance (H2) predicted a
significant and positive effect on all models. Chain members with a long-term relationship
and trust are identified as being able to achieve better performances (Dolci et al., 2017). This
result is expected as previous research in the agribusiness sector has shown that trust is a
critical determinant of a good performing relationship (Mesic et al., 2018; Molnár et al., 2010;
Odongo et al., 2016; Koopmans et al., 2018). According to Wacker et al. (2016), relational
governance displays positive influence on performance. Furthermore, Sezen and Yilmaz
(2007) report that chain members build their relationships based on mutual trust because
exchange relationships with a high level of trust and commitment provide each chain actor
more benefits and profits than it can be obtained in a non-trust governance mechanism.
First suppliers Second supplier upstream Second supplier downstream Buyers
Path Estimates p Estimates p Estimates p Estimates p
SMKT → CP 0.38 *** −0.77 *** 0.79 *** −0.08
MIGS → CP −0.37 *** −0.12 – 0.27 ** 0.50 ***
RGS → CP 0.70 *** 0.37 *** 0.39 *** 0.26 **
CGS → CP – −0.06 – 0.24 ** 0.15
Notes: **p¼ 0.05; ***p¼ 0.001
Table V.
Summary of
the results for
the subgroups’
structural models
Fit indexes Acceptable range Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
χ2/df ⩽3.0 2.381 2.595 1.983 4.617 1.710
RMSEA ⩽0.08 0.051 0.065 0.057 0.074 0.069
GFI ⩾0.90 0.910 0.891 0.900 0.901 0.910
AGFI ⩾0.90 0.901 0.884 0.893 0.899 0.900
CFI ⩾0.90 0.974 0.945 0.944 0.942 0.960
NFI ⩾0.90 0.936 0.914 0.933 0.930 0.916
IFI ⩾0.90 0.948 0.945 0.944 0.942 0.960
Table IV.
Fit indexes of the
structural models of
independent samples
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The results of this study partially observe a positive and significant influence of contractual
governance and chain performance, which partially supports H3 downstream suppliers). The
finding is in agreement with Dolci et al. (2017), who argue that the control of activities is
essential for achieving performance that faces changes over time. The control of processes in
the dairy value chain is crucial for improving performance (Dolci et al., 2017). Formal contracts
are used by cooperative managers as mechanisms that attempt to mitigate risk and uncertainty
in exchange relationships (Lusch and Brown, 1996). A clear contract ensures that transaction
terms and conditions are effectively enforceable (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992). When conflicts
arise among chain partners, solutions are provided through a contract which is lawful.
On the other hand, we observed an insignificant path for the first suppliers and second
suppliers in estimating the influence of contractual governance on chain performance.
This finding is in agreement with Schulze et al. (2007), who observed an insignificant link
between contractual governance and performance in a German pork supply chain. Although
contracts provide effective safeguards for the chain partners to protect themselves from the
chain partner’s opportunism, they are also expensive to implement effectively (Macneil, 1977;
Williamson, 1985). Therefore, incomplete contracts which consist of moral hazards, information
hold-up and opportunism significantly increase transaction costs (Huang et al., 2014).
The insignificance of contractual governance is likely due to the fact that the dairy farmers are
not convinced of the benefits of the formal exchange arrangements. Birthal et al. (2017) also
observed that formal structure suffers from low compliance rates probably due to weak legal
institutions and enforcement mechanisms.
The findings provide partial support for H4. It is observed that MI influences chain
performance, which improves efficiency, responsiveness, quality and flexibility for the
downstream buyers and the upstream second suppliers. In Uganda, mini integrated
transactions are arrangements coordinated by dairy processors mostly by means of informal
or formal agreements with the second suppliers. In these transactions, the integrator allocates
production equipment, such as milk coolers, milk tanks for transportation, and provides
technical support in production, depending on the type of agreement with the chain partner.
This is especially important for the dairy sector where small-scale producers are dominant.
Therefore, the majority of processors depend on MI with second suppliers. Similarly, our
findings are in line with the results of Zhou et al. (2015), who found that collaborative and
integrated activities minimize opportunism within the chain partners.
On the other hand, the first suppliers perceived a negative and significant link between
MI and chain performance, whereas, for the second suppliers, it is insignificant. This
indicates that chain members do not receive sufficient technical support or mutual benefit
and their join decisions are not considered by the downstream chain members. Previous
studies have found that the same degree of integration can have a different impact on the
firm performance depending on whether the share distribution of the leading ﬁrms reﬂects
clear leadership or similar market share positions (Ruzzier, 2009). This should be a point of
improvement in the future because stronger resource control and coordination mechanisms
associated with hierarchies are more effective in dealing with difficulties related to the
performance of the agri-food chains (Trifković, 2016).
6. Managerial implications
The reported findings have relevant implications for policy makers and managers.
According to the findings, chain members can use the result of the study to take certain
measures which improve the performance of the chains they are affiliated to. It was
observed that relational governance performs better; therefore, strengthening and
maintaining long-term relationships is very important for chain partners. It is also
necessary to establish trust and commitment within the chain relationships. Collaborative
actions and the presence of trust within the chain partners are key aspects to create
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integration and, in the end, lead to gains for all the parties involved. Furthermore, the
establishment of a good reputation based on trust can be achieved by greater concern for
the economic satisfaction of the chain partners (Mesic et al., 2018).
When contracts are not overly applied due to other legal and institutional constraints, the
downstream chain managers face challenges to reduce the complexity of transactions along
the chain. Therefore, the policy makers must develop formal control infrastructure to help
buyers and suppliers solidify the chain members’ collective interests, which can reduce
opportunism and the conflicts of individual members. Still, suppliers and buyers use
relational governance to improve chain performance with their chain partners. The
Ugandan dairy actors should also use formal contracts to improve transaction within
the dairy sector. The alignment of both chain governance structures is more effective than
the use of only one. All chain members, especially the downstream suppliers and buyers,
should commit to exercising the optimal combination of both governance mechanisms
(Huang et al., 2014). As pointed out by Liu et al. (2009), managers should combine different
elements of chain governance to improve chain performance. A similar case is seen in
Toyota’s supplier system in Japan (Dyer and Chu (2003). The appropriate usage of formal
contracts exerts a significant influence indeed to improve chain performance. However, the
usage of formal control should be carefully evaluated and flexibly used to avoid strict
contract regulations and monitoring ex post costs. Furthermore, adaptable formal control
activities that can concurrently contribute to fostering social control should be listed in the
chain management principles (Huang et al., 2014).
7. Limitations of the study and final remarks
Besides the conceptual contribution of this paper, the main strength of this study pertains to
its large triad sample, including three chain members at different chain levels. The focus on
chain level analysis and data collection from minimum three firms of chains as opposed to
dyadic chain level contributes to the limited number of triadic studies (Mesic et al., 2018;
Molnár et al., 2010; Odongo et al., 2016). This study investigated 115 triads and benchmarked
chain performance within the dairy sector, and compared 460 chain members’ perceptions.
The data were collected from a single country; more specifically, the study was conducted in
Uganda, thereby filling the gap of limited research attention in developing countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa. More so, the empirical contribution of this study also lies in the choice of
the food sector. The dairy sector has also received very little attention in scientific literature.
Consequently, there was a need to extend the focus of the dairy industry to downstream and
upstream chain members to increase awareness of both the individual and chain
competitiveness and performance.
Despite the paper contributions, some limitations are worthy to be acknowledged, which
open up opportunities for further research. First, our findings are based on a single survey
collecting quantitative data, and the result can only testify to the situations of three subgroups
with different forms of governance structures and performance; it does not study multiple
chains. A multiple chain analysis research design should be considered for future studies to
clearly draw out the relationship between chain governance structures and chain performance
across several food sectors. Second, another limitation of this research is the fact that the
sample is located in only one country (Uganda), which reduces the potential generalization
of the results. Future research can consider multiple countries with the same context.
Third, although this research contributes by providing additional confirmation of the
relationships between chain governance structures and chain performance, control variables,
such as the length of relationship, income, level of education and production units, were not
analyzed to measure the causality between CGS and CP from different perspectives. As for
further research, we would recommend studies to analyze the phenomenon to estimate the
moderating effect of control variables.
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Appendix
Notes: Model fit statistics are: 2/df=2.595, RMSEA=0.065,
GFI=0.891, AGFI=0.884, CFI=0.945, NFI=0.914, IFI=0.945
Figure A1.
First suppliers’ model
Notes: Model fit statistics are: 2/df=1.982, RMSEA=0.057,
GFI=0.900, AGFI=0.893, CFI=0.944, NFI=0.933, IFI=0.944
Figure A2.
Upstream buyers’
model
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Notes: Model fit statistics are: 2/df=4.617, RMSEA=0.074,
GFI=0.901, AGFI=0.899, CFI=0.942, NFI=0.930, IFI=0.942
Figure A3.
Downstream
suppliers’ model
Notes: Model fit statistics are: 2/df=1.710, RMSEA=0.069,
GFI=0.910, AGFI=0.900, CFI=0.960, NFI=0.916, IFI=0.960
Figure A4.
Buyers’ model
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